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1 Introduction
In 1988, output per worker in the United States was more than 35 times
higher than output per worker in Niger. In just over ten days, the average
worker in the United States produced as much as an average worker in Niger
produced in an entire year. Explaining such vast dierences in economic
performance is one of the fundamental challenges of economics.
Analysis based on an aggregate production function provides some in-
sight into these dierences, an approach taken by Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992) and Dougherty and Jorgenson (1996), among others. Dierences
among countries can be attributed to dierences in human capital, physical
capital, and productivity. Building on their analysis, our results suggest
that dierences in each element of the production function are important.
In particular, however, our results emphasize the key role played by pro-
ductivity. For example, consider the 35-fold dierence in output per worker
between the United States and Niger. Dierent capital intensities in the two
countries contributed a factor of 1.5 to the income dierences, while dierent
levels of educational attainment contributed a factor of 3.1. The remaining
dierence | a factor of 7.7 | remains as the productivity residual.
The breakdown suggested by the aggregate production function is just
the rst step in understanding dierences in output per worker. Findings
in the production function framework raise deeper questions such as: Why
do some countries invest more than others in physical and human capital?
And why are some countries so much more productive than others? These
are the questions that this paper tackles. When aggregated through the
production function, the answers to these questions add up to explain the
dierences in output per worker across countries.
Our hypothesis is that dierences in capital accumulation, productivity,
and therefore output per worker are fundamentally related to dierences
in social infrastructure across countries. By social infrastructure, we meanOutput per Worker Across Countries 2
the institutions and government policies that determine the economic envi-
ronment within which individuals accumulate skills, and rms accumulate
capital and produce output. A social infrastructure favorable to high lev-
els of output per worker provides an environment that supports productive
activities and encourages capital accumulation, skill acquisition, invention,
and technology transfer. Such a social infrastructure gets the prices right so
that, in the language of North and Thomas (1973), individuals capture the
social returns to their actions as private returns.
Social institutions to protect the output of individual productive units
from diversion are an essential component of a social infrastructure favor-
able to high levels of output per worker. Thievery, squatting, and Maa
protection are examples of diversion undertaken by private agents. Para-
doxically, while the government is potentially the most ecient provider of
social infrastructure that protects against diversion, it is also in practice a
primary agent of diversion throughout the world. Expropriation, consca-
tory taxation, and corruption are examples of public diversion. Regulations
and laws may protect against diversion, but they all too often constitute the
chief vehicle of diversion in an economy.
Across 127 countries, we nd a powerful and close association be-
tween output per worker and measures of social infrastructure. Countries
with long-standing policies favorable to productive activities|rather than
diversion|produce much more output per worker. For example, our anal-
ysis suggests that the observed dierence in social infrastructure between
Niger and the United States is more than enough to explain the 35-fold
dierence in output per worker.
Our research is related to many earlier contributions. The large body
of theoretical and qualitative analysis of property rights, corruption, and
economic success will be discussed in Section 3. The recent empirical growth
literature associated with Barro (1991) and others shares some commonOutput per Worker Across Countries 3
elements with our work, but our empirical framework diers fundamentally
in its focus on levels instead of rates of growth. This focus is important for
several reasons.
First, levels capture the dierences in long-run economic performance
that are most directly relevant to welfare as measured by the consumption
of goods and services.
Second, several recent contributions to the growth literature point to-
ward a focus on levels instead of growth rates. Easterly, Kremer, Pritch-
ett and Summers (1993) document the relatively low correlation of growth
rates across decades, which suggests that dierences in growth rates across
countries may be mostly transitory. Jones (1995) questions the empirical
relevance of endogenous growth and presents a model in which dierent
government policies are associated with dierences in levels, not growth
rates. Finally, a number of recent models of idea ﬂows across countries such
as Parente and Prescott (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Eaton
and Kortum (1995) imply that all countries will grow at a common rate in
the long run: technology transfer keeps countries from drifting indenitely
far from each other. In these models, long-run dierences in levels are the
interesting dierences to explain.
Some of the cross-country growth literature recognizes this point. In par-
ticular, the growth regressions in Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992) are explicitly motivated by a neoclassical growth model in
which long-run growth rates are the same across countries or regions. These
studies emphasize that dierences in growth rates are transitory: countries
grow more rapidly the further they are below their steady state. Never-
theless, the focus of such growth regressions is to explain the transitory
dierences in growth rates across countries.1 Our approach is dierent|we
1The trend in the growth literature has been to use more and more of the short-run
variation in the data. For example, several recent studies use panel data at 5 or 10-year
intervals and include country xed eects. The variables we focus on change so slowlyOutput per Worker Across Countries 4
try to explain the variation in long-run economic performance by studying
directly the cross-section relation in levels.2
The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the strong relation be-
tween social infrastructure and output per worker. Countries with corrupt
government ocials, severe impediments to trade, poor contract enforce-
ment, and government interference in production will be unable to achieve
levels of output per worker anywhere near the norms of western Europe,
northern America, and eastern Asia. Our contribution is to show, quantita-
tively, how important these eects are.
We can summarize our analysis of the determinants of dierences in
economic performance among countries as:
Output per Worker  − (Inputs, Productivity)  − Social Infrastructure.
This framework serves several purposes. First, it allows us to distinguish be-
tween the proximate causes of economic success|capital accumulation and
productivity|and the more fundamental determinant. Second, the frame-
work claries the contribution of our work. We concentrate on the relation
between social infrastructure and dierences in economic performance. The
production function-productivity analysis allows us to trace this relation
through capital accumulation and productivity.
We are conscious that feedback may occur from output per worker back
to social infrastructure. For example, it may be that poor countries lack
the resources to build eective social infrastructures. We control for this
feedback by using the geographical and linguistic characteristics of an econ-
omy as instrumental variables. We view these characteristics as measures of
over time that their eects may be missed entirely in such studies.
2Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) also analyze levels of economic performance. In
cross-country growth regressions that include the initial level of income and emphasize
the transition dynamics interpretation, one can map the growth regression coecients
into eects on the long-run level of income. However, we know of only one attempt to do
this mapping, the prepublication version of Sachs and Warner (1997).Output per Worker Across Countries 5
the extent to which an economy is inﬂuenced by Western Europe, the rst
region of the world to implement broadly a social infrastructure favorable
to production. Controlling for endogeneity, we still nd that dierences in
social infrastructure across countries account for much of the dierence in
long-run economic performance around the world.
2 Levels Accounting
Our analysis begins by examining the proximate causes of economic suc-
cess. We decompose dierences in output per worker across countries into
dierences in inputs and dierences in productivity.
There are three approaches to the decomposition of output per worker
into inputs and productivity. One was developed by Christensen, Cummings
and Jorgenson (1981) and involves the comparison of each country to a
reference point. A country's productivity residual is formed by weighting the
log-dierences of each factor input from the reference point by the arithmetic
average of the country's factor share and the reference factor share. The
second is similar, except that the factor shares are assumed to be the same
for all countries; this amounts to calculating the residual from a Cobb-
Douglas technology. Finally, there is a method based directly on Solow
(1957), discussed in a predecessor to this paper, Hall and Jones (1996), and
summarized below. Because the Solow method gives results quite similar to
those based on Christensen et al. (1981) or on Cobb-Douglas with standard
elasticities, we will not dwell on this aspect of the work. We present results
based on the simplest Cobb-Douglas approach.
Assume output Yi in country i is produced according to
Yi = K
i (AiHi)1−; (1)
where Ki denotes the stock of physical capital, Hi is the amount of human
capital-augmented labor used in production, and Ai is a labor-augmentingOutput per Worker Across Countries 6
measure of productivity. We assume labor Li is homogeneous within a coun-
try and that each unit of labor has been trained with Ei years of schooling
(education). Human capital-augmented labor is given by
Hi = e(Ei)Li: (2)
In this specication, the function (E) reﬂects the eciency of a unit of labor
with E years of schooling relative to one with no schooling ((0) = 0). The
derivative 0(E) is the return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian wage
regression (Mincer 1974): an additional year of schooling raises a worker's
eciency proportionally by 0(E).3 Note that if (E) = 0 for all E this is a
standard production function with undierentiated labor.
With data on output, capital, and schooling, and knowledge of  and
(), one can calculate the level of productivity directly from the production
function. It turns out to be convenient to rewrite the production function







where h  H=L is human capital per worker.
This equation allows us to decompose dierences in output per worker
across countries into dierences in the capital-output ratio, dierences in
educational attainment, and dierences in productivity. We follow David
(1977), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) in
writing the decomposition in terms of the capital-output ratio rather than
the capital-labor ratio, for two reasons. First, along a balanced growth
path, the capital-output ratio is proportional to the investment rate, so that
this form of the decomposition also has a natural interpretation. Second,
consider a country that experiences an exogenous increase in productivity,
3Bils and Klenow (1996) suggest that this is the appropriate way to incorporate years
of schooling into an aggregate production function.Output per Worker Across Countries 7
holding its investment rate constant. Over time, the country's capital-labor
ratio will rise as a result of the increase in productivity. Therefore, some of
the increase in output that is fundamentally due to the increase in produc-
tivity would be attributed to capital accumulation in a framework based on
the capital-labor ratio.
To measure productivity and decompose dierences in output per worker
into dierences in capital intensity, human capital per worker, and produc-
tivity, we use data on output, labor input, average educational attainment,
and physical capital for the year 1988.
Our basic measure of economic performance is the level of output per
worker. National income and product account data and labor force data
are taken from the Penn World Tables Mark 5.6 revision of Summers and
Heston (1991). We do not have data on hours per worker for most countries,
so we use the number of workers instead of hours to measure labor input.
Our calculations of productivity also incorporate a correction for natural re-
sources used as inputs. Because of inadequate data, our correction is quite
coarse: we subtract value added in the mining industry (which includes oil
and gas) from GDP in computing our measure of output. That is, we assign
all of mining value added to natural resource inputs and neglect capital and
labor inputs in mining. Without this correction, resource-rich countries such
as Oman and Saudi Arabia would be among the top countries in terms of
productivity.4 Average educational attainment is measured in 1985 for the
population aged 25 and over, as reported by Barro and Lee (1993). Phys-
ical capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory method.5
4Apart from the ranking of productivity and output per worker, none of our empirical
results that follow are sensitive to this correction. We compute the mining share of GDP
in current prices from United Nations (1994) for most countries. Data for China, Israel,
Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Italy, Poland, and Romania are taken from United Nations (1993).
5We limit our sample to countries with investment data going back at least to 1970 and
use all available investment data. For example, suppose 1960 is the rst year of investment
data for some country. We estimate the initial value of the 1960 capital stock for that
country as I60=(g + )w h e r eg is calculated as the average geometric growth rate fromOutput per Worker Across Countries 8
Because we only need data on the capital stock for 1988, our measure is
quite insensitive to the choice of the initial value. Our data set includes 127
countries.6
Regarding the parameters of the production function, we take a standard
neoclassical approach.7 We assume a value of  =1 =3, which is broadly con-
sistent with national income accounts data for developed countries. With re-
spect to human capital, Psacharopoulos (1994) surveys evidence from many
countries on return-to-schooling estimates. Based on his summary of Mince-
rian wage regressions, we assume that (E) is piecewise linear. Specically,
for the rst 4 years of education, we assume a rate of return of 13.4 per-
cent, corresponding to the average Psacharopoulos reports for sub-Saharan
Africa. For the next 4 years, we assume a value of 10.1 percent, the average
for the world as a whole. Finally, for education beyond the 8th year, we use
the value Psacharopoulos reports for the OECD, 6.8 percent.
2.1 Productivity Calculations by Country
Figure 1 shows productivity levels across countries plotted against output
per worker. The gure illustrates that dierences in productivity are very
similar to dierences in output per worker; the correlation between the two
series (in logs) is 0.89. Apart from Puerto Rico8, the countries with the
1960 to 1970 of the investment series. We assume a depreciation rate of 6 percent.
6As discussed in more detail later, we had to impute the data on educational attainment
for 27 of these countries.
7This is a natural benchmark. It ignores externalities from physical and human capital.
We believe there is little compelling evidence of such externalities, much less any estimate
of their magnitudes. We leave a more general analysis of such possibilities in our framework
to future work.
8Puerto Rico deserves special mention as it is|by far|the most productive country
according to our calculation. Its output per worker is similar to that in the U.K. but
measured inputs are much lower. The result is a high level of productivity. Baumol and
Wol (1996) comment on Puerto Rico's extraordinary recent growth in output per worker.
In addition, there is good reason to believe that Puerto Rico's national income accounts
overstate output. Many U.S. rms have located production facilities there because of low
tax rates. To take maximum advantage of those low rates and to avoid higher U.S. rates,Output per Worker Across Countries 9
Figure 1: Productivity and Output per Worker
Coeff =   0.600
StdErr=   0.028
  R2  =    0.79










































































































































































highest levels of productivity are Italy, France, Hong Kong, Spain, and Lux-
embourg. Those with the lowest levels are Zambia, Comoros, Burkina Faso,
Malawi, and China. U.S. productivity ranks 13th out of 127 countries.
Table 1 decomposes output per worker in each country into the three
multiplicative terms in equation (3): the contribution from physical capital
intensity, the contribution from human capital per worker, and the contri-
bution from productivity. It is important to note that this productivity
level is calculated as a residual, just as in the growth accounting literature.
To make the comparisons easier, all terms are expressed as ratios to U.S.
values.9 For example, according to this table, output per worker in Canada
they may report exaggerated internal transfer prices when the products are moved within
the rm from Puerto Rico back to the U.S. When these exaggerated non-market prices
are used in the Puerto Rican output calculations, they result in an overstatement of real
output.
9A complete set of results is reported in the Appendix table.Output per Worker Across Countries 10
Table 1: Productivity Calculations: Ratios to U.S. Values
||Contribution from||
Country Y=L (K=Y )
=(1−) H=L A
United States 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Canada 0.941 1.002 0.908 1.034
Italy 0.834 1.063 0.650 1.207
West Germany 0.818 1.118 0.802 0.912
France 0.818 1.091 0.666 1.126
United Kingdom 0.727 0.891 0.808 1.011
Hong Kong 0.608 0.741 0.735 1.115
Singapore 0.606 1.031 0.545 1.078
Japan 0.587 1.119 0.797 0.658
Mexico 0.433 0.868 0.538 0.926
Argentina 0.418 0.953 0.676 0.648
U.S.S.R. 0.417 1.231 0.724 0.468
India 0.086 0.709 0.454 0.267
China 0.060 0.891 0.632 0.106
Kenya 0.056 0.747 0.457 0.165
Zaire 0.033 0.499 0.408 0.160
Average, 127 Countries: 0.296 0.853 0.565 0.516
Standard Deviation: 0.268 0.234 0.168 0.325
Correlation w/ Y=L (logs) 1.000 0.624 0.798 0.889
Correlation w/ A (logs) 0.889 0.248 0.522 1.000
Note: The elements of this table are the empirical counterparts to the
components of equation (3), all measured as ratios to the U.S. val-
ues. That is, the rst column of data is the product of the other three
columns.
is about 94 percent of that in the United States. Canada has about the
same capital intensity as the United States, but only 91 percent of U.S.
human capital per worker. Dierences in inputs explain lower Canadian
output per worker, so Canadian productivity is about the same as U.S.
productivity. Other OECD economies such as the United Kingdom also
have productivity levels close to U.S. productivity. Italy and France areOutput per Worker Across Countries 11
slightly higher; Germany is slightly lower.10
Consistent with conventional wisdom, the U.S.S.R. has extremely high
capital intensity and relatively high human capital but a rather low produc-
tivity level. For the developing countries in the table, dierences in produc-
tivity are the most important factor in explaining dierences in output per
worker. For example, Chinese output per worker is about 6 percent of that
in the United States, and the bulk of this dierence is due to lower pro-
ductivity: without the dierence in productivity, Chinese output per worker
would be more than 50 percent of U.S. output per worker.
The bottom half of Table 1 reports the average and standard deviation
of the contribution of inputs and productivity to dierences in output per
worker. According to either statistic, dierences in productivity across coun-
tries are substantial. A simple calculation emphasizes this point. Output
per worker in the ve countries in 1988 with the highest levels of output
per worker was 31.7 times higher than output per worker in the ve lowest
countries (based on a geometric average). Relatively little of this dierence
was due to physical and human capital: dierences in capital intensity and
human capital per worker contributed factors of 1.8 and 2.2, respectively,
to the dierence in output per worker. Productivity, however, contributed
a factor of 8.3 to this dierence: with no dierences in productivity, output
per worker in the ve richest countries would have been only about four
times larger than in the ve poorest countries. In this sense, dierences in
physical capital and educational attainment explain only a modest amount
of the dierence in output per worker across countries.
The reason for the lesser importance of capital accumulation is that most
of the variation in capital-output ratios arises from variation in investment
rates. Average investment rates in the ve richest countries are only 2.9
times larger than average investment rates in the ve poorest countries.
10Hours per worker are higher in the United States than in France and Italy, making
their productivity levels more surprising.Output per Worker Across Countries 12
Moreover, this dierence gets raised to the power =(1 − )w h i c hf o ra
neoclassical production function with  =1 =3 is only 1/2|so it is the
square root of the dierence in investment rates that matters for output
per worker. Similarly, average educational attainment in the ve richest
countries is about 8.1 years greater than average educational attainment
in the ve poorest countries, and this dierence also gets reduced when
converted into an eect on output: each year of schooling contributes only
something like 10 percent (the Mincerian return to schooling) to dierences
in output per worker. Given the relatively small variation in inputs across
countries and the small elasticities implied by neoclassical assumptions, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that dierences in productivity | the residual
| play a key role in generating the wide variation in output per worker
across countries.
Our earlier paper, Hall and Jones (1996), compared results based on
the Cobb-Douglas formulation with alternative results based on the ap-
plication of Solow's method with a spatial rather than temporal ordering
of observations.11 In this latter approach, the production function is not
restricted to Cobb-Douglas and factor shares are allowed to dier across
countries. The results were very similar. We do not think that the sim-
ple Cobb-Douglas approach introduces any important biases into any of the
results presented in this paper.
Our calculation of productivity across countries is related to a calcu-
lation performed by Mankiw et al. (1992). Two important dierences are
11More specically, assume that the index for observations in a standard growth account-
ing framework with Y = AF(K;H) refers to countries rather than time. The standard
accounting formula still applies: the dierence in output between two countries is equal to
a weighted average of the dierences in inputs plus the dierence in productivity, where
the weights are the factor shares. As in Solow (1957), the weights will generally vary
across observations. The only subtlety in this calculation is that time has a natural order,
whereas countries do not. In our calculations, we found that the productivity results were
robust to dierent orderings (in order of output per worker or of total factor input, for
example).Output per Worker Across Countries 13
worth noting. First, they estimate the elasticities of the production function
econometrically. Their identifying assumption is that dierences in produc-
tivity across countries are uncorrelated with physical and human capital
accumulation. This assumption seems questionable, as countries that pro-
vide incentives for high rates of physical and human capital accumulation
are likely to be those that use their inputs productively, particularly if our
hypothesis that social infrastructure inﬂuences all three components has
any merit. Our empirical results also call this identifying assumption into
question since, as shown in Table 1, our measure of productivity is highly
correlated with human capital accumulation and moderately correlated with
the capital-output ratio. Second, they give little emphasis to dierences in
productivity, which are econometric residuals in their framework; they em-
phasize the explanatory power of dierences in factor inputs for dierences
in output across countries. In contrast, we emphasize our nding of sub-
stantial dierences in productivity levels across countries. Our productivity
dierences are larger in part because of our more standard treatment of hu-
man capital and in part because we do not impose orthogonality between
productivity and the other factors of production.12
Finally, a question arises as to why we nd a large Solow residual in
levels. What do the measured dierences in productivity across countries
actually reﬂect? First, from an accounting standpoint, dierences in physi-
cal capital intensity and dierences in educational attainment explain only
a small fraction of the dierences in output per worker across countries.
One interpretation of this result is that we must turn to other dierences,
12In helping us to think about the dierences, David Romer suggested that the treatment
of human capital in MRW implies that human capital per worker varies by a factor of
more than 1200 in their sample, which may be much higher than is reasonable. Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) explore the dierences between these two approaches in more
detail. Extending the MRW analysis, Islam (1995) reports large dierences in productivity
levels, but his results, led by econometric estimates, neglect dierences in human capital
in computing the levels.Output per Worker Across Countries 14
such as the quality of human capital, on-the-job training, or vintage eects.
That is, we could add to the inputs included in the production function.
A second and complementary interpretation of the result suggests that a
theory of productivity dierences is needed. Dierences in technologies may
be important | for example, Parente and Prescott (1996) construct a the-
ory in which insiders may prevent new technologies from being adopted.
In addition, in economies with social infrastructures not conducive to e-
cient production, some resources may be used to protect against diversion
rather than to produce output: capital could consist of security systems and
fences rather than factories and machinery. Accounting for the dierences
in productivity across countries is a promising area of future research.
3 Determinants of Economic Performance
At an accounting level, dierences in output per worker are due to dif-
ferences in physical and human capital per worker and to dierences in
productivity. But why do capital and productivity dier so much across
countries? The central hypothesis of this paper is that the primary, fun-
damental determinant of a country's long-run economic performance is its
social infrastructure. By social infrastructure, we mean the institutions and
government policies that provide the incentives for individuals and rms in
an economy. Those incentives can encourage productive activities such as
the accumulation of skills or the development of new goods and production
techniques, or those incentives can encourage predatory behavior such as
rent-seeking, corruption, and theft.
Productive activities are vulnerable to predation. If a farm cannot be
protected from theft, then thievery will be an attractive alternative to farm-
ing. A fraction of the labor force will be employed as thieves, making no
contribution to output. Farmers will spend more of their time protecting
their farms from thieves and consequently grow fewer crops per hour ofOutput per Worker Across Countries 15
eort.
Social control of diversion has two benets. First, in a society free
of diversion, productive units are rewarded by the full amount of their
production|where there is diversion, on the other hand, it acts like a tax
on output. Second, where social control of diversion is eective, individual
units do not need to invest resources in avoiding diversion. In many cases,
social control is much cheaper than private avoidance. Where there is no
eective social control of burglary, for example, property owners must hire
guards and put up fences. Social control of burglary involves two elements.
First is the teaching that stealing is wrong. Second is the threat of punish-
ment. The threat itself is free|the only resources required are those needed
to make the threat credible. The value of social infrastructure goes far be-
yond the notion that collective action can take advantage of returns to scale
in avoidance. It is not that the city can put up fences more cheaply than
can individuals|in a city run well, no fences are needed at all.
Social action|typically through the government|is a prime determi-
nant of output per worker in almost any view. The literature in this area is
far too voluminous to summarize adequately here. Important contributions
are Olson (1965), Olson (1982), Baumol (1990), North (1990), Greif and
Kandel (1995), and Weingast (1995).
A number of authors have developed theoretical models of equilibrium
when protection against predation is incomplete.13 Workers choose between
production and diversion. There may be more than one equilibrium|for ex-
ample, there may be a poor equilibrium where production pays little because
diversion is so common, and diversion has a high payo because enforcement
is ineective when diversion is common. There is also a good equilibrium
with little diversion, because production has a high payo and the high
probability of punishment deters almost all diversion. Rapaczynski (1987)
13See, for example, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Schrag and
Scotchmer (1993), Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995), Grossman and Kim (1996).Output per Worker Across Countries 16
gives Hobbes credit for originating this idea. Even if there is only a single
equilibrium in these models, it may be highly sensitive to its determinants
because of near-indeterminacy.
Thus the suppression of diversion is a central element of a favorable
social infrastructure. The government enters the picture in two ways. First,
the suppression of diversion appears to be most ecient if it is carried out
collectively, so the government is the natural instrument of anti-diversion
eorts. Second, the power to make and enforce rules makes the government
itself a very eective agent of diversion. A government supports productive
activity by deterring private diversion and by refraining from diverting itself.
Of course, governments need revenue in order to carry out deterrence, which
requires at least a little diversion through taxation.
Diversion takes the form of rent seeking in countries of all types, and is
probably the main form of diversion in more advanced economies (Krueger
1974). Potentially productive individuals spend their eorts inﬂuencing the
government. At high levels, they lobby legislatures and agencies to provide
benets to their clients. At lower levels, they spend time and resources
seeking government employment. They use litigation to extract value from
private business. They take advantage of ambiguities in property rights.
Successful economies limit the scope of rent seeking. Constitutional pro-
visions restricting government intervention, such as the provisions in the
U.S. Constitution prohibiting interference with interstate commerce, reduce
opportunities for rent seeking. A good social infrastructure will plug as
many holes as it can where otherwise people could spend time bettering
themselves economically by methods other than production. In addition to
its direct eects on production, a good social infrastructure may have im-
portant indirect eects by encouraging the adoption of new ideas and new
technologies as they are invented throughout the world.Output per Worker Across Countries 17
4 Estimating the Eect of Social Infrastructure
Two important preliminary issues are the measurement of social infrastruc-
ture and the econometric identication of our model.
4.1 Measurement
The ideal measure of social infrastructure would quantify the wedge between
the private return to productive activities and the social return to such
activities. A good social infrastructure ensures that these returns are kept
closely in line across the range of activities in an economy, from working in
a factory to investing in physical or human capital to creating new ideas or
transferring technologies from abroad, on the positive side, and from theft
to corruption on the negative side.
In practice, however, there does not exist a usable quantication of
wedges between private and social returns, either for single countries or
for the large group of countries considered in this study. As a result, we
must rely on proxies for social infrastructure and recognize the potential for
measurement error.
We form our measure of social infrastructure by combining two indexes.
The rst is an index of government anti-diversion policies (GADP) created
from data assembled by a rm that specializes in providing assessments of
risk to international investors, Political Risk Services.14 Their International
Country Risk Guide rates 130 countries according to 24 categories. We fol-
low Knack and Keefer (1995) in using the average of 5 of these categories
for the years 1986-1995. Two of the categories relate to the government's
role in protecting against private diversion: (i) law and order, and (ii) bu-
14See Coplin, O'Leary and Sealy (1996) and Knack and Keefer (1995). Barro (1997)
considers a measure from the same source in regressions with the growth of GDP per
capita. Mauro (1995) uses a similar variable to examine the relation between investment
and growth of income per capita, on the one hand, and measures of corruption and other
failures of protection, on the other hand.Output per Worker Across Countries 18
reaucratic quality. Three categories relate to the government's possible role
as a diverter: (i) corruption, (ii) risk of expropriation, and (iii) government
repudiation of contracts. Our GADP variable is an equal-weighted average
of these 5 variables, each of which has higher values for governments with
more eective policies for supporting production. The index is measured on
as c a l ef r o mz e r ot oo n e .
The second element of our measure of social infrastructure captures the
extent to which a country is open to international trade. Policies toward
international trade are a sensitive index of social infrastructure. Not only
does the imposition of taris divert resources to the government, but taris,
quotas, and other trade barriers create lucrative opportunities for private
diversion. In addition, policies favoring free trade yield benets associated
with the trade itself. Trade with other countries yields benets from spe-
cialization and facilitates the adoption of ideas and technologies from those
countries. Our work does not attempt to distinguish between trade policies
as measures of a country's general infrastructure and the specic benets
that come from free trade itself.
Sachs and Warner (1995) have compiled an index that focuses on the
openness of a country to trade with other countries. An important advantage
of their variable is that it considers the time since a country adopted a
more favorable social infrastructure. The Sachs-Warner index measures the
fraction of years during the period 1950 to 1994 that the economy has been
open and is measured on a [0,1] scale. A country is open if it satises all
of the following criteria: (i) nontari barriers cover less than 40 percent of
trade, (ii) average tari rates are less than 40 percent, (iii) any black market
premium was less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s, (iv) the
country is not classied as socialist by Kornai (1992), and (v) the government
does not monopolize major exports.
In most of the results that we present, we will impose (after testing) theOutput per Worker Across Countries 19
restriction that the coecients for these two proxies for social infrastruc-
ture are the same. Hence, we focus primarily on a single index of social
infrastructure formed as the average of the GADP and openness measures.
4.2 Identication
To examine the quantitative importance of dierences in social infrastruc-
ture as determinants of incomes across countries, we hypothesize the follow-
ing structural model:
logY=L=  + S + ; (4)
and
S = γ +  logY=L+ X+ ; (5)
where S denotes social infrastructure and X is a collection of other variables.
Several features of this framework deserve comment. First, we recognize
explicitly that social infrastructure is an endogenous variable. Economies are
not exogenously endowed with the institutions and incentives that make up
their economic environments, but rather social infrastructure is determined
endogenously, perhaps depending itself on the level of output per worker in
an economy. Such a concern arises not only because of the general possibility
of feedback from the unexplained component of output per worker to social
infrastructure, but also from particular features of our measure of social
infrastructure. For example, poor countries may have limited ability to
collect taxes and may therefore be forced to interfere with international
trade. Alternatively, one might be concerned that the experts at Political
Risk Services who constructed the components of the GADP index were
swayed in part by knowledge of income levels.
Second, our specication for the determination of incomes in equation (4)
is parsimonious, reﬂecting our hypothesis that social infrastructure is the
primary and fundamental determinant of output per worker. We allow for
a rich determination of social infrastructure through the variables in the XOutput per Worker Across Countries 20
matrix. Indeed, we will not even attempt to describe all of the potential
determinants of social infrastructure | we will not estimate equation (5)
of the structural model. The heart of our identifying assumptions is the
restriction that the determinants of social infrastructure aect output per
worker only through social infrastructure and not directly. We test the
exclusion below.
Our identifying scheme includes the assumption that EX0 = 0. Under
this assumption, any subset of the determinants of social infrastructure con-
stitute valid instruments for estimation of the parameters in equation (4).
Consequently, we do not require a complete specication of that equation.
We will return to this point in greater detail shortly.
Finally, we augment our specication by recognizing, as discussed in the
previous section, that we do not observe social infrastructure directly. In-
stead, we observe a proxy variable ~ S computed as the sum of GADP and
the openness variable, normalized to a [0,1] scale. This proxy for social
infrastructure is related to true social infrastructure through random mea-
surement error:
~ S =  S +  (6)
where  is the measurement error, taken to be uncorrelated with S and X.
Without loss of generality, we normalize   = 1; this is an arbitrary choice
of units since S is unobserved. Therefore,
S = ~ S − :
Using this measurement equation, we rewrite equation (4) as
logY=L=  +  ~ S +~ ; (7)
where
~    − :Output per Worker Across Countries 21
The coecient  will be identied by the orthogonality conditions EX0~  =
0. Therefore, both measurement error and endogeneity concerns are ad-
dressed. The remaining issue to discuss is how we obtain valid instruments
for GADP and our openness measure.
4.3 Instruments
Our choice of instruments considers several centuries of world history. One
of the key features of the 16th through 19th centuries was the expansion of
Western European inﬂuence around the world. The extent of this inﬂuence
was far from uniform, and thus provides us with identifying variation which
we will take to be exogenous. Our instruments are various correlates of the
extent of Western European inﬂuence. These are characteristics of geogra-
phy such as distance from the equator and the extent to which the primary
languages of Western Europe | English, French, German, Portuguese, and
Spanish | are spoken as rst languages today.
Our instruments are positively correlated with social infrastructure. West-
ern Europe discovered the ideas of Adam Smith, the importance of property
rights, and the system of checks and balances in government, and the coun-
tries that were strongly inﬂuenced by Western Europe were, other things
equal, more likely to adopt favorable infrastructure.
That the extent to which the languages of Western Europe are spoken as
a mother tongue is correlated with the extent of Western European inﬂuence
seems perfectly natural. However, one may wonder about the correlation of
distance from the equator with Western European inﬂuence. We suggest
this is plausible for two reasons. First, Western Europeans were more likely
to migrate to and settle regions of the world that were sparsely populated
at the start of the 15th century. Regions such as the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina appear to satisfy this criterion. Sec-
ond, it appears that Western Europeans were more likely to settle in areasOutput per Worker Across Countries 22
that were broadly similar in climate to Western Europe, which again points
to regions far from the equator.15
The other important characteristic of an instrument is lack of correlation
with the disturbance ~ . To satisfy this criterion, we must ask if European
inﬂuence was somehow more intensively targeted toward regions of the world
that are more likely to have high output per worker today. In fact, this does
not seem to be the case. On the one hand, Europeans did seek to conquer
and exploit areas of the world that were rich in natural resources such as
gold and silver or that could provide valuable trade in commodities such as
sugar and molasses. There is no tendency today for these areas to have high
output per worker.
On the other hand, European inﬂuence was much stronger in areas of
the world that were sparsely settled at the beginning of the 16th century,
such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina.
Presumably, these regions were sparsely settled at that time because the land
was not especially productive given the technologies of the 15th century. For
these reasons, it seems reasonable to assume that our measures of Western
European inﬂuence are uncorrelated with ~ .
We measure distance from the equator as the absolute value of latitude in
degrees divided by 90 to place it on a 0 to 1 scale.16 It is widely known that
economies further from the equator are more successful in terms of per capita
income. For example, Nordhaus (1994) and Theil and Chen (1995) examine
15Engerman and Sokolo (1997) provide a detailed historical analysis complementary
to this story. They conclude that factor endowments such as geography, climate, and
soil conditions help explain why the social infrastructure that developed in the United
States and Canada was more conducive to long-run economic success than the social
infrastructure that developed in Latin America.
16The latitude of each country was obtained from the Global Demography Project at
U.C. Santa Barbara (http://www.ciesin.org/datasets/gpw/globldem.doc.html), discussed
by Tobler, Deichmann, Gottsegen and Maloy (1995). These location data correspond to
the center of the county or province within a country that contains the largest number
of people. One implication of this choice is that the data source places the center of the
United States in Los Angeles, somewhat south of the median latitude of the country.Output per Worker Across Countries 23
closely the simple correlation of these variables. However, the explanation
for this correlation is far from agreed upon. Kamarck (1976) emphasizes a
direct relationship through the prevalence of disease and the presence of a
highly variable rainfall and inferior soil quality. We will postulate that the
direct eect of such factors is small and impose the hypothesis that the eect
is zero | hence distance from the equator is not included in equation (4).
Because of the presence of overidentifying restrictions in our framework,
however, we are able to test this hypothesis, and we do not reject it, either
statistically or economically, as discussed later in the paper.
Our data on languages comes from two sources: Hunter (1992), and, to
a lesser extent, Gunnemark (1991).17 We use two language variables: the
fraction of a country's population speaking one of the ve primary Western
European languages (including English) as a mother tongue, and the fraction
speaking English as a mother tongue. We are, therefore, allowing English
and the other languages to have separate impacts.
Finally, we also use as an instrument the variable constructed by Frankel
and Romer (1996): the (log) predicted trade share of an economy, based on
a gravity model of international trade that only uses a country's population
and geographical features.
Our data set includes 127 countries for which we were able to construct
measures of the physical capital stock using the Summers and Heston data
set. For these 127 countries, we were also able to obtain data on the primary
languages spoken, geographic information, and the Frankel-Romer predicted
trade share. However, missing data was a problem for four variables: 16
countries in our sample were missing data on the openness variable, 17 were
missing data on the GADP variable, 27 were missing data on educational
attainment, and 15 were missing data on the mining share of GDP. We
imputed values for these missing data using the 79 countries for which we
17The sources often disagree on exact numbers. Hunter (1992) is much more precise,
containing detailed data on various dialects and citations to sources (typically surveys).Output per Worker Across Countries 24
Figure 2: Social Infrastructure and Output Per Worker



























































































































































have a complete set of data.18
5 Basic Results
Figure 2 plots output per worker against our measured index of social in-
frastructure. The countries with the highest measured levels of social in-
frastructure are Switzerland, the United States, and Canada, and all three
18 For each country with missing data, we used a set of independent variables to impute
the missing data. Specically, let C denote the set of 79 countries with complete data.
Then, (i) For each country i not in C,l e tW be the independent variables with data and V
be the variables that are missing data. (ii) Using the countries in C,r e g r e s sV on W. (iii)
Use the coecients from these regressions and the data W(i) to impute the values of V (i).
The variables in V and W were indicator variables for type of economic organization, the
fraction of years open, GADP, the fraction of population speaking English at home, the
fraction of population speaking a European language at home, and a quadratic polynomial
for distance from the equator. In addition, total educational attainment and the mining
share of GDP were included in V but not in W, i.e. they were not treated as independent.Output per Worker Across Countries 25
are among the countries with the highest levels of output per worker. Three
countries that are close to the lowest in social infrastructure are Zaire, Haiti,
and Bangladesh, and all three have low levels of output per worker.
Consideration of this gure leads to two important questions addressed
in this section. First, what is the impact on output per worker of a change in
an exogenous variable that leads to a one unit increase in social infrastruc-
ture? Second, what is the range of variation of true social infrastructure?
We see in Figure 2 that measured social infrastructure varies considerably
along this 10-point scale. How much of this is measurement error, and how
much variation is there across countries in true social infrastructure? Com-
bining the answers to these two general questions allows us to quantify the
overall importance of dierences in social infrastructure across countries in
explaining dierences in long-run economic performance.
Table 2 reports the results for the estimation of the basic relation between
output per worker and social infrastructure. Standard errors are computed
using a bootstrap method that takes into account the fact that some of the
data have been imputed.19
The main specication in Table 2 reports the results from instrumental
variables estimation of the eect of a change in social infrastructure on the
log of output per worker. Four instruments are used: distance from the
equator, the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share, and the fractions of the
population speaking English and a European language, respectively. The
point estimate indicates that a dierence of .01 in social infrastructure is
associated with a dierence in output per worker of 5.14 percent. With a
19The bootstrap proceeds as follows, with 10,000 replications. First, we draw uniformly
127 times from the set of 79 observations for which there is no missing data. Second,
we create missing data. For each \country," we draw from the sample joint distribution
of missing data to determine which variables, if any, are missing (any combination of
GADP and years open). Third, we impute the missing data, using the method described
in footnote 18. Finally, we use instrumental variables on the generated data to get a new
estimate,  . The standard errors reported in the table are calculated as the standard
deviation of the 10,000 observations of  .Output per Worker Across Countries 26
Table 2: Basic Results for Output per Worker
log Y=L=  +  ~ S +~ 
OverID Test Coe Test
Social p-value p-value
Specication Infrastructure Test Result Test Result ^ ~ 
1. Main Specication 5.142 .256 .812 .840
(.508) Accept Accept
Alternative Specications to Check Robustness
2. Instruments: 4.998 .208 .155 .821
Distance, Frankel-Romer (.567) Accept Accept
3. No Imputed Data 5.323 .243 .905 .889
79 Countries (.607) Accept Accept
4. OLS 3.289 | .002 .700
(.212) Reject
The coecient on Social Infrastructure reﬂects the change in log output per worker as-
sociated with a one unit increase in measured social infrastructure. For example, the
coecient of 5.14 means than a dierence of .01 in our measure of social infrastructure
is associated with a 5.14 percent dierence in output per worker. Standard errors are
computed using a bootstrap method, as described in the text. The \Main Specication"
uses distance from the equator, the Frankel-Romer instrument, the fraction of the popu-
lation speaking English at birth, and the fraction of the population speaking a Western
European language at birth as instruments. The \OverID Test" column reports the
result of testing the overidentifying restrictions and the \Coe Test" reports the result
of testing for the equality of the coecients on the GADP policy index variable and the
openness variable. The standard deviation of logY=L is 1.078.Output per Worker Across Countries 27
standard error of .508, this coecient is estimated with considerable preci-
sion.
The second column of numbers in the table reports the result of testing
the overidentifying restrictions of the model, such as the orthogonality of
the error term and distance from the equator. These restrictions are not
rejected. Similarly, we test for the equality of the coecients on the two
variables that make up our social infrastructure index, and this restriction
is also not rejected.
The lower rows of the table show that our main result is robust to the
use of a more limited set of instruments and to estimation using only the
79 countries for which we have a complete data set. In results not reported
in the table, we have dropped one instrument at a time to ensure that no
single instrument is driving the results. The smallest coecient on social
infrastructure obtained in this robustness check was 4.93.
Our estimate of  tells us the dierence in log output per worker of a
dierence in some exogenous variable that leads to a dierence in social in-
frastructure. The point estimate indicates that a dierence of .01 in social
infrastructure, as we measure it, is associated with a dierence in output
per worker of a little over 5 percent. Because we believe that social infras-
tructure is measured with error, we need to investigate the magnitude of
the errors in order to understand this number. We need to determine how
much variation there is in true, as opposed to measured, social infrastructure
across countries.
Our discussion starts from the premise that true simultaneity results in a
positive correlation between the disturbance in our structural equation and
social infrastructure. Recall that our system is:
logY=L=  +  ~ S +  − ; (8)
S = γ +  logY=L+ X+ : (9)Output per Worker Across Countries 28
The reduced-form equation for ~ S is
~ S =
γ +  +  + X+ 
1 − 
+ : (10)
Correlation of ~ S with  arises from two sources. One is feedback con-
trolled by the parameter . Provided the system satises the stability condi-
tion  < 1, a positive value of  implies that  is positively correlated with
~ S. As we noted earlier, the natural assumption is that  is non-negative,
since social infrastructure requires some resources to build, and logY=L
measures those resources.
The second source of correlation of ~ S with  is correlation of  with .
Again, it would appear plausible that countries with social infrastructure
above the level of the second structural equation would tend to be the same
countries that had output per worker above the rst structural equation.
Thus, both sources of correlation appear to be non-negative.
On the other hand, as the reduced-form equation for ~ S shows, measured
social infrastructure is unambiguously positively correlated with the mea-
surement error, . Hence there is a negative correlation between ~ S and the
part of the disturbance in the rst structural equation arising from measure-
ment error, −.
Information about the net eect of the positive correlation arising from
simultaneity and the negative correlation arising from measurement error is
provided by the dierence between the instrumental variables estimate of
 and the ordinary least squares estimate. The last row of Table 2 reports
the latter. Because the OLS estimate is substantially smaller than the IV
estimate, measurement error is the more important of the two inﬂuences.
Under the assumption that there is no true simultaneity problem, that
is,  is uncorrelated with ~ S, we can calculate the standard deviation of
true social infrastructure, S, from the dierence between the IV and OLS
estimates. A standard result in the econometrics of measurement error isOutput per Worker Across Countries 29
that OLS is biased toward zero by a multiplicative factor equal to the ratio
of the variance of the true value of the right-hand variable to the variance










That is, we can estimate the standard deviation of true social infrastructure
relative to the standard deviation of measured social infrastructure as the
square root of the ratio of the OLS and IV estimates. With our estimates,
the ratio of the standard deviations is 0.800.
If the correlation of ~ S and  is positive, so true simultaneity is a problem,
additional information is required to pin down S. The positive correlation
from endogeneity permits a larger negative correlation from measurement
error and therefore a larger standard deviation of that measurement error.
A simple calculation indicates that the ratio of standard deviations given in
equation (11) is the correlation between measured and true social infrastruc-
ture, which we will denote r~ S;S. Therefore, a lower bound on the correlation
between measured and true social infrastructure provides a lower bound on
S. It is our belief, based on comparing the data in Figure 2 to our pri-
ors, that the R2 or squared correlation between true and measured social
infrastructure is no smaller than 0.5. This implies a lower bound on r~ S;S of
p
:5=:707.
With these numbers in mind, we will consider the implications of our
estimate of ^ IV =5 :14. Measured social infrastructure ranges from a low
value of 0.1127 in Zaire to a high value of 1.0000 in Switzerland. Ignor-
ing measurement error, the implied range of variation in output per worker
would be a factor of 95, which is implausibly high. We can apply the ra-
tio r~ S;S = S=~ S to get a reasonable estimate of the range of variation
of true social infrastructure.20 The lower bound on this range implied by
20That is, we calculate exp(r ~ S;S ^ IV(~ Smax − ~ Smin)).Output per Worker Across Countries 30
r~ S;S = :707 suggests that dierences in social infrastructure can account for
a 25.2-fold dierence in output per worker across countries. Alternatively, if
there is no true endogeneity so that r~ S;S = :800, dierences in social infras-
tructure imply a 38.4-fold dierence in output per worker across countries.
For comparison, recall that output per worker in the richest country (the
United States) and the poorest country (Niger) in our data set dier by a
factor of 35.1.
We conclude that our results indicate that dierences in social infrastruc-
ture account for much of the dierence in long-run economic performance
throughout the world, as measured by output per worker. Countries most
inﬂuenced by Europeans in past centuries have social infrastructures con-
ducive to high levels of output per worker, as measured by our variables,
and, in fact, have high levels of output per worker. Under our identifying
assumptions, this evidence means that infrastructure is a powerful causal
factor promoting higher output per worker.
5.1 Reduced-Form Results
Table 3 reports the two reduced-form regressions corresponding to our main
econometric specication. These are OLS regressions of log output per
worker and social infrastructure on the four main instruments. Interpret-
ing these regressions calls for care: our framework does not require that
these reduced forms be complete in the sense that all exogenous variables
are included. Rather, the equations are useful but potentially incomplete
reduced-form equations.
The reduced-form equations document the close relationship between
our instruments and actual social infrastructure. Distance from the equa-
tor, the Frankel-Romer predicted trade share, and the fraction of the popu-
lation speaking a European language (including English) combine to explain
a substantial fraction of the variance of our index of social infrastructure.Output per Worker Across Countries 31
Table 3: Reduced Form Regressions
|| Dependent Variables ||
Social Log(Output
Regressors Infrastructure per Worker)
Distance from the 0.708 3.668
Equator, (0,1) Scale (.110) (.337)
Log of Frankel-Romer 0.058 0.185
Predicted Trade Share (.031) (.081)
Fraction of Population 0.118 0.190
Speaking English (.076) (.298)
Fraction of Population 0.130 0.995
Speaking a European Lang (.050) (.181)
R
2 .41 .60
Note: N=127. Standard errors are computed using a bootstrap
method, as described in the text. A constant term is included
but not reported.
Similarly, these instruments are closely related to long-run economic perfor-
mance as measured by output per worker.
5.2 Results by Component
Table 4 examines in more detail the sources of dierences in output per
worker across countries by considering why some countries have higher pro-
ductivity or more physical or human capital than others.
The dependent variables in this table use the contributions to output per
worker (the log of the terms in equation (3)), so that adding the coecients
across columns reproduces the coecient in the main specication of Table 2.
Broadly speaking, the explanations are similar. Countries with a good socialOutput per Worker Across Countries 32
Table 4: Results for logK=Y ,l o gH=L,a n dl o gA
Component =  +  ~ S +~ 
|| Dependent Variable ||

1− log K=Y log H=L log A
Social 1.052 1.343 2.746
Infrastructure (.164) (.171) (.336)
OverID Test (p) .784 .034 .151
Test Result Accept Reject Accept
^ ~  .310 .243 .596
^ DepV ar .320 .290 .727
Note: Estimation is carried out as in the main speci-
cation in Table 2. Standard errors are computed using
a bootstrap method, as described in the text.
infrastructure have high capital intensities, high human capital per worker,
and high productivity. Each of these components contributes to high output
per worker.
Along with this broad similarity, some interesting dierences are evident
in Table 4. The residual in the equation for capital intensity is particularly
large, as measured by the estimated standard deviation of the error. This
leads to an interesting observation. The United States is an excellent ex-
ample of a country with good social infrastructure, but its stock of physical
capital per unit of output is not remarkable. While the U.S. ranks rst in
output per worker, second in educational attainment, and 13th in produc-
tivity, its capital-output ratio ranks 39th among the 127 countries. The U.S.
ranks much higher in capital per worker (7th) because of its relatively high
productivity level.
Table 5 summarizes the extent to which dierences in true social infras-Output per Worker Across Countries 33





of Variation 35.1 4.5 3.1 19.9
Ratio, 5 richest to
5 poorest countries 31.7 1.8 2.2 8.3
Predicted Variation,




~ S;S = :5 25.2 1.9 2.3 5.6
The rst two rows report actual factors of variation in the
data, rst for the separate components and then for the geo-
metric average of the 5 richest and 5 poorest countries (sorted
according to Y=L). The last two rows report predicted factors
of variation based on the estimated range of variation of true
social infrastructure. Specically, these last two rows report
exp(r^ IV(~ Smax − ~ Smin)), rst with r = :800 and second with
r
2 = :5.
tructure can explain the observed variation in output per worker and its
components. The rst row of the table documents the observed factor of
variation between the maximum and minimum values of output per worker,
capital intensity, and other variables in our data set. The second row shows
numbers we have already reported in the interpretation of the productivity
results. Countries are sorted by output per worker, and then the ratio of
the geometric average of output per worker in the 5 richest countries to the
5 poorest countries is decomposed into the product of a capital intensity
term, a human capital term, and productivity. The last two rows of the ta-
ble use the basic coecient estimates from Tables 2 and 4 to decompose the
predicted factor of variation in output into its multiplicative components.Output per Worker Across Countries 34
One sees from this table that dierences in social infrastructure are suf-
cient to account for the bulk of the observed range of variation in capital
intensity, human capital per worker, and productivity.21 Interpreted through
an aggregate production function, these dierences are able to account for
much of the variation in output per worker.
6 Robustness of the Results
The central equation estimated in this paper has only a single fundamental
determinant of a country's output per worker, social infrastructure. Our
maintained hypothesis (already tested in part using the test of overiden-
tifying restrictions) is that this relation does not omit other fundamental
determinants of output per worker. For example, characteristics of an econ-
omy such as the size of government, the rate of inﬂation, or the share of
high-tech goods in international trade are all best thought of in our opinion
as outcomes rather than determinants. Just as investment in skills, capital
and technologies, these variables are determined primarily by a country's
social infrastructure.
To examine the robustness of our specication, we selected a set of can-
didates to be additional fundamental determinants and consider a range of
specications. These alternative specications are reported in Table 6.
The rst two specications redene measured social infrastructure to be
either the GADP variable or the Sachs-Warner openness variable, rather
than the average of the two. The results are similar to those in our main
specication. When social infrastructure is measured by GADP alone, the
overidentifying restrictions are rejected | some of the instruments appear
to belong in the equation.
21One must be careful in interpreting these results since social infrastructure is po-
tentially endogenous. What this statement really means is that dierences in exogenous
variables that lead to the observed range of variation in social infrastructure would imply
the factors of variation reported in the table.Output per Worker Across Countries 35
Table 6: Robustness Results
log Y=L=  +  ~ S + AddedV ariable +~ 
OverID Test
Social Additional p-value
Specication Infrastructure Variable Test Result ^ ~ 
1. ~ S = GADP 5.410 ... .006 .769
(.394) Reject
2. ~ S =Years Open 4.442 ... .131 1.126
(.871) Accept
3. Distance from Equator 5.079 0.062 .129 .835
(2.61) (2.062) Accept
4. Ethnolinguistic Fractional- 5.006 -0.223 .212 .816
ization (N=113) (.745) (.386) Accept
5. Religious Aliation 4.980 See .478 .771
(N=121) (.670) Note Accept
6. Log(Population) 5.173 0.047 .412 .845
(.513) (.060) Accept
7. Log(C-H Density) 5.195 -.546 .272 .850
(.539) (1.11) Accept
8. Capitalist System 6.354 -1.057 .828 .899
Indicator Variable (1.14) (.432) Accept
9. Instruments: Main Set plus 4.929 ... .026 .812
Continent Dummies (.388) Reject
See notes to Table 2. Instruments are the same as in Table 2, except where noted.
Additional variables are discussed in the text. The coecients on the religious variables
in line 3, followed by standard errors, are Catholic (0.992, .354), Muslim (0.877, .412),
Protestant (0.150, .431), and Hindu (0.839, 1.48).Output per Worker Across Countries 36
In the third specication, we treat distance from the equator as an in-
cluded exogenous variable. The result, consistent with previous overidenti-
fying tests, is little change in the coecient on social infrastructure and a
small and insignicant coecient on distance from the equator.22 This sup-
ports our contention that the bulk of the high simple correlation between
distance from the equator and economic performance occurs because histor-
ical circumstances lead this variable to proxy well for social infrastructure.
The fourth specication examines the ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(ELF) index computed by Taylor and Hudson (1972) and used by Mauro
(1995). ELF measures the probability that any two people chosen at random
from within a country will belong to dierent ethnic or linguistic groups.
While the simple association of this variable with output per worker is quite
strong, the partial regression coecient is small in magnitude (the variable
is measured on a [0,1] scale) and statistically insignicant.
The fth specication adds religious aliation variables to the specica-
tion. Specically, these variables measure the fraction (on a [0,1] scale) of a
country's population aliated with the Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, and
Hindu religions.23 The point estimate on social infrastructure is changed
little when these variables are included in the specication. Both Catholic
and Muslim aliation variables enter signicantly into the regression, while
the Protestant and Hindu variables do not.
The sixth specication adds the log of population to the regression. A
number of recent growth models in the tradition of Romer (1990) emphasize
that nonrivalry of ideas should lead to increasing returns to scale. Our
22The large standard error on social infrastructure is somewhat misleading. The associ-
ated p-value testing the hypothesis of a zero coecient on social infrastructure (computed
from the bootstrap distribution of coecients) is only 0.008. The large standard error |
the standard deviation of the bootstrap coecients | occurs because the distribution of
coecients is skewed heavily toward the right, i.e. toward positive values. In contrast, the
distribution of the bootstrap coecients for distance from the equator is skewed heavily
toward the left.
23These data were provided by Robert Barro and are discussed in Barro (1997).Output per Worker Across Countries 37
simple attempt to measure scale with population does not nd evidence of
this eect. One explanation is that national boundaries do not limit the
areas where ideas are applied.
The seventh specication considers a measure of the density of economic
activity, computed following the methods of Ciccone and Hall (1996).24 The
density measure is constructed to have a theoretical coecient of one|
it would have precisely this value in Ciccone and Hall's cross section of
states. Here, however, in a cross section of countries, the variation in other
determinants of output per worker is so large that it is dicult to measure
the eects of density with much precision.
The results for the eighth specication are unexpected. This specication
adds an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for countries that are cate-
gorized as capitalist or mixed-capitalist by the Freedom House (1994). The
odd result is that the regression coecient implies that capitalist countries
produce substantially less output per worker than otherwise similar noncap-
italist countries. In part, this reﬂects the particular denition of capitalism
employed by the Freedom House. According to their classication, a number
of sub-Saharan African economies are classied as capitalist.
The nal specication of Table 6 adds a list of continent dummies to
the instrument set.25 As with the other specications, the coecient on
social infrastructure is unchanged by the addition of the continents to the
instrument list. However, the overidentication test now rejects the restric-











where Ni is the population of country i, Si is the set of all provinces in country i, ns is the
population of province s,a n das is the area of province s. We use a value of γ =1 :058,
as estimated by Ciccone and Hall. This value implies that doubling density increases Di
by about 6 percent.
25The continents are North America (including Central America), South America,
Africa, Asia (plus Oceania), and Europe.Output per Worker Across Countries 38
tions, in part because African economies have lower output per worker than
otherwise similar economies on other continents.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Countries produce high levels of output per worker in the long run because
they achieve high rates of investment in physical capital and human capital
and because they use these inputs with a high level of productivity. Our
empirical analysis suggests that success on each of these fronts is driven by
social infrastructure. A country's long-run economic performance is deter-
mined primarily by the institutions and government policies that make up
the economic environment within which individuals and rms make invest-
ments, create and transfer ideas, and produce goods and services.
Our major ndings can be summarized by the following points:
1. Many of the predictions of growth theory can be successfully consid-
ered in a cross-section context by examining the levels of income across
countries.
2. The large variation in output per worker across countries is only par-
tially explained by dierences in physical capital and educational at-
tainment. Paralleling the growth accounting literature, levels account-
ing nds a large residual that varies considerably across countries.
3. Dierences in social infrastructure across countries cause large dier-
ences in capital accumulation, educational attainment, and productiv-
ity, and therefore large dierences in income across countries.
4. The extent to which dierent countries have adopted dierent social
infrastructures is partially related to the extent to which they have
been inﬂuenced by Western Europe. Using distance from the equa-
tor and language data, we conclude that our nding that dierencesOutput per Worker Across Countries 39
in social infrastructure cause large dierences in income is robust to
measurement error and endogeneity concerns.Output per Worker Across Countries 40
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Table 7: Productivity Calculations, Ratios to U.S. Values
||Contribution from||
Country Code Y=L (K=Y )
=(1−) H=L A
U.S.A. USA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Luxembourg LUX 0.986 1.116 0.805 1.098
Canada CAN 0.941 1.002 0.908 1.034
Switzerland CHE 0.874 1.189 0.832 0.883
Australia AUS 0.843 1.094 0.900 0.856
Belgium BEL 0.836 1.023 0.836 0.978
Italy ITA 0.834 1.063 0.650 1.207
West Germany DEU 0.818 1.118 0.802 0.912
France FRA 0.818 1.091 0.666 1.126
Netherlands NLD 0.806 1.060 0.803 0.946
Sweden SWE 0.787 1.029 0.853 0.897
Norway NOR 0.759 1.196 0.909 0.699
Finland FIN 0.734 1.179 0.855 0.728
Iceland ISL 0.730 1.023 0.764 0.933
U.K. GBR 0.727 0.891 0.808 1.011
New Zealand NZL 0.717 1.117 1.017 0.631
Puerto Rico PRI 0.711 0.827 0.550 1.564
Austria AUT 0.709 1.076 0.674 0.979
Denmark DNK 0.690 1.082 0.905 0.705
Spain ESP 0.682 1.018 0.605 1.107
Israel ISR 0.659 0.948 0.851 0.817
Hong Kong HKG 0.608 0.741 0.735 1.115
Singapore SGP 0.606 1.031 0.545 1.078
Japan JPN 0.587 1.119 0.797 0.658
Ireland IRL 0.577 1.052 0.773 0.709
Saudi Arabia SAU 0.528 0.904 0.560 1.043
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 0.498 0.956 0.664 0.785
Venezuela VEN 0.495 0.994 0.593 0.839
Greece GRC 0.469 1.023 0.680 0.674
Malta MLT 0.463 0.902 0.692 0.743
Cyprus CYP 0.446 0.975 0.708 0.646
Taiwan OAN 0.445 0.821 0.699 0.776
Syria SYR 0.438 0.812 0.515 1.048
Mexico MEX 0.433 0.868 0.538 0.926
Oman OMN 0.424 1.132 0.565 0.663
Argentina ARG 0.418 0.953 0.676 0.648
U.S.S.R. SUN 0.417 1.231 0.724 0.468
Jordan JOR 0.416 0.783 0.532 0.998
Barbados BRB 0.404 0.728 0.733 0.756
Korea KOR 0.380 0.861 0.761 0.580
Portugal PRT 0.366 0.960 0.504 0.755
Uruguay URY 0.340 0.888 0.661 0.579
Algeria DZA 0.328 1.023 0.416 0.771
Brazil BRA 0.319 0.873 0.482 0.758Output per Worker Across Countries 48
||Contribution from||
Country Code Y=L (K=Y )
=(1−) H=L A
Hungary HUN 0.307 1.124 0.932 0.293
Yugoslavia YUG 0.300 1.241 0.710 0.340
Iran IRN 0.295 0.981 0.469 0.642
Fiji FJI 0.273 0.921 0.682 0.435
Malaysia MYS 0.267 1.004 0.592 0.450
Colombia COL 0.264 0.818 0.544 0.593
Chile CHL 0.263 0.989 0.661 0.403
Mauritius MUS 0.262 0.614 0.548 0.778
Costa Rica CRI 0.257 0.862 0.590 0.506
Suriname SUR 0.254 0.979 0.400 0.650
South Africa ZAF 0.250 0.959 0.568 0.460
Poland POL 0.238 1.278 0.795 0.235
Ecuador ECU 0.237 1.012 0.605 0.386
Peru PER 0.237 0.935 0.618 0.409
Reunion REU 0.226 0.854 0.510 0.518
Panama PAN 0.223 1.008 0.651 0.340
Turkey TUR 0.218 0.925 0.469 0.503
Tunisia TUN 0.217 0.755 0.421 0.683
Seychelles SYC 0.215 0.808 0.407 0.654
Yemen YEM 0.212 0.617 0.336 1.022
Czechoslovakia CSK 0.211 1.146 0.763 0.241
Guatemala GTM 0.210 0.652 0.427 0.753
Dominican Republic DOM 0.206 0.824 0.525 0.477
Namibia NAM 0.194 1.255 0.477 0.324
Egypt EGY 0.187 0.454 0.576 0.716
Morocco MAR 0.187 0.618 0.575 0.527
Paraguay PRY 0.170 0.808 0.554 0.379
Swaziland SWZ 0.164 0.754 0.500 0.436
Gabon GAB 0.157 1.304 0.408 0.295
Thailand THA 0.157 0.739 0.575 0.369
El Salvador SLV 0.157 0.641 0.487 0.501
Sri Lanka LKA 0.155 0.662 0.593 0.394
Bolivia BOL 0.140 0.862 0.531 0.305
Honduras HND 0.130 0.738 0.486 0.361
Jamaica JAM 0.130 1.064 0.524 0.232
Pakistan PAK 0.128 0.582 0.390 0.566
Bangladesh BGD 0.127 0.384 0.393 0.844
Philippines PHL 0.126 0.854 0.663 0.223
Nicaragua NIC 0.126 0.894 0.501 0.281
Congo COG 0.122 0.680 0.460 0.389
Romania ROM 0.113 1.037 0.608 0.180
Indonesia IDN 0.110 0.915 0.499 0.242Output per Worker Across Countries 49
||Contribution from||
Country Code Y=L (K=Y )
=(1−) H=L A
Guyana GUY 0.105 1.247 0.577 0.146
Ivory Coast CIV 0.097 0.739 0.447 0.294
Botswana BWA 0.094 1.100 0.496 0.172
India IND 0.086 0.709 0.454 0.267
Papua New Guinea PNG 0.078 0.948 0.377 0.218
Cameroon CMR 0.076 0.684 0.407 0.274
Cape Verde Island CPV 0.076 0.992 0.472 0.162
Senegal SEN 0.072 0.477 0.416 0.361
Sudan SDN 0.067 0.837 0.341 0.233
Zimbabwe ZWE 0.065 0.898 0.429 0.170
Sierra Leone SLE 0.064 0.291 0.380 0.581
Lesotho LSO 0.063 0.678 0.483 0.192
China CHN 0.060 0.891 0.632 0.106
Benin BEN 0.059 0.605 0.332 0.294
Haiti HTI 0.057 0.575 0.375 0.263
Kenya KEN 0.056 0.747 0.457 0.165
Ghana GHA 0.052 0.516 0.465 0.218
Zambia ZMB 0.051 1.209 0.535 0.079
Mauritania MRT 0.050 0.961 0.423 0.124
Somalia SOM 0.049 0.682 0.410 0.174
Gambia GMB 0.048 0.534 0.338 0.269
Nigeria NGA 0.048 0.937 0.367 0.140
Guinea GIN 0.043 0.516 0.414 0.201
Rwanda RWA 0.043 0.441 0.338 0.287
Madagascar MDG 0.041 0.299 0.514 0.264
Togo TGO 0.040 0.879 0.402 0.113
Guinea-Bissau GNB 0.039 0.859 0.325 0.140
Mozambique MOZ 0.039 0.349 0.349 0.321
Comoros COM 0.035 0.875 0.453 0.089
Mali MLI 0.035 0.524 0.337 0.196
Central African Rep CAF 0.033 0.582 0.357 0.159
Angola AGO 0.033 0.493 0.457 0.146
Zaire ZAR 0.033 0.499 0.408 0.160
Chad TCD 0.032 0.358 0.428 0.210
Tanzania TZA 0.032 0.650 0.410 0.119
Uganda UGA 0.032 0.362 0.390 0.224
Burundi BDI 0.030 0.495 0.395 0.152
Malawi MWI 0.030 0.677 0.427 0.102
Burkina Faso BFA 0.029 0.581 0.502 0.101
Myanmar BUR 0.029 0.668 0.396 0.109
Niger NER 0.029 0.680 0.325 0.129